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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 04-1026
                    
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHEREE WHITE
Appellant
                    
On Appeal From the United States 
District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 02-cr-00375)
District Judge:  Hon. Charence C. Newcomer
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 7, 2005
BEFORE:  AMBRO, STAPLETON and ALARCON,*
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 28, 2005)
                    
                                                     
Hon. Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts, we do not
fully recount them below.  In 2003, a jury sitting in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned a verdict against Appellant Sheree White,
finding her guilty on three counts of a Superseding Indictment:  Count 1 – conspiracy to
commit armed bank robbery, Count 2 – armed bank robbery, and Count 3 – use of a
firearm during commission of a violent felony.  Appellant appeals her convictions and
sentence.  We will affirm the judgment of conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for
resentencing.
I.  Rule 404(b) Evidence
Appellant challenges the admission, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
of evidence of two prior armed robberies committed by an unindicted co-conspirator, both
of which were committed with the assistance of the unindicted co-conspirator’s girlfriend
at the time.  Appellant argues that the evidence should have been excluded as not meeting
the threshold for relevance and as more prejudicial than probative.  We review the
District Court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of
discretion.  United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).
      Rule 404(b) provides:1
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. . . .
      Admissible evidence under Rule 404(b) is not limited to evidence against defendants;2
as opposed to Rule 404(a), which relates to character evidence of an accused, witness or
victim, Rule 404(b) applies to other acts evidence regarding a “person.”  See United
States v. Lucas, 357 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Rule 404(b) is not limited
to evidence concerning the accused).
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Rule 404(b) countenances the admission of evidence of other crimes for purposes
other than the purpose of proving the character of a person, in order to show action in
conformity therewith.  Other permissible purposes include, for example, to show “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”  Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) ; see also United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 1281
(3d Cir. 1999) (favoring the admission of such evidence “if relevant for any other purpose
than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the
crime”).2
Admissibility under Rule 404(b) requires (1) a proper evidentiary purpose; (2)
relevance under Rule 402; (3) a weighing of the probative value of the evidence against
any unfair prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) a limiting instruction concerning the
purpose for which the evidence may be used.  Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d
176, 189 (3d Cir. 2000).  The parameters of relevant evidence under Rule 404(b) are set
4by the material issues and facts the government must prove to obtain a conviction.  See
United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 1992).
The first two requirements are easily met.  Other acts evidence satisfies the first
two requirements if it is “probative of a material issue other than character.”  Huddleston
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988).  Here, the government was charged with
proving the existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.  The government
therefore bore the burden of showing that the unindicted individual, Williams, as well as
Appellant, were conspirators.  The theory of the conspiracy was that Williams enlisted
Appellant, his then-girlfriend, to help orchestrate a bank robbery.  The other acts evidence
was offered to show that the robbery in question was planned and executed according to
Williams’ established methodology, i.e., that Williams’ “signature crime” was enlisting
and using girlfriends to act as his insider.  This evidence is clearly probative of the issue
of whether William’s involvement with the defendant was innocent, or part of a
conspiracy – i.e., it is relevant to show that it was more probable or less probable that
Williams was involved as a conspirator. 
With regard to the third prong of the analysis, a significant danger of undue
prejudice will only be found in cases where there are “substantial possibilities that a jury
will harbor strong adverse sensitivity to the challenged evidence.”  United States v.
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996).  Here, the probative value of the evidence was
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  The government had a clear need
5for the evidence given its burden of establishing the knowing involvement of both
Williams and Appellant and the circumstantial nature of its case.  The evidence was not
of a distracting, confusing, or emotionally charged nature that was likely to mislead a
jury.  Finally, the other acts were in no way imputable to Appellant (indeed, the evidence
was from before Appellant ever knew Williams), and so there was no unreasonable risk
that the evidence might be misconstrued as propensity evidence.  Furthermore, the
District Court gave an appropriate limiting instruction concerning the purpose for which
the evidence may be used.  United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir.
1999).
In sum, the other acts evidence had relevance to the factual issues at trial, and the
District Court properly determined that the evidence’s probative value outweighed its
prejudicial effect.  There was, therefore, no abuse of discretion in ruling the evidence
admissible at trial.
II.  Sentence
Appellant also challenges her sentence under United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct.
738 (2005).  The Government concedes that it is appropriate for this Court to vacate
Appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing in light of Booker.  We agree. 
Accordingly, we will vacate Appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing in
accordance with Booker.  United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2005) (denying
rehearing en banc).
6III.  Conclusion
Appellant’s judgment of conviction will be affirmed, her sentence will be vacated,
and this case will be remanded for resentencing.
